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In advanced capitalist societies it is clear that work­
ers' standard of living, in the aggregate, is well above the 
so-called subsistence minimum. In this situation, along 
Kaldorian lines, we may investigate the possibilities and 
consequences of allowing savings out of wages in addition to 
savings out of profits. Now, if workers save or if savings 
are made, in the aggregate, by representatives of the class, 
out of wages (and contractual income in general) then they 
will own a part of the economy's stock of capital. If they 
own a part of this stock of capital, they should, naturally, 
be allowed to see it develop, subject to constraints, ac­
cording to their own criteria. A capitalist could be as­
sumed to invest according to various types of profit crite­
ria. These criteria need not, and will not, motivate work­
ers. It is perhaps more realistic to assume that workers 
strive to achieve full employment at the cost of most every­
thing else. It was a similar sort of reasoning that made 
Pasinetti question Kaldor's original theory (cf. Pasinetti 
(1974) Ch. V and Kaldor (1955-6)):
There is a logical slip, in the (Kaldorian) theory 
. . ., which has so far passed unnoticed. The authors 
have neglected the important fact that, in any type of 
society, when any individual saves a part of his in­
come, he must also be allowed to own it, otherwise he 
would not save at all. . . . And since ownership of 
capital entitles the owner to a rate of interest, if 
workers have saved— and thus own a part of the stock of 
capital . . . — then they will also receive a share of 
the total profits. Therefore total profits themselves 
must be divided into two categories: profits which ac­
crue to the capitalist and profits which accrue to the 
workers.




























































































We may then wonder whether there is not also a 'logical slip' 
in Pasinetti's extension, if workers own a part of the total 
stock of capital, then not only should they receive the rul­
ing rate of interest on that part of the capital stock which 
they own— but also should be allowed to influence the direc­
tion of future developments in the scale and composition of 
the capital stock. In other words, should we not modify the 
concept of a single investment equation in a macrodynamic 
model? It is the consequences, for the level of employment 
and functional shares, of the removal of this simple assump­
tion— that workers do not influence investment decisions—  
that we investigate in this paper.
It may be recalled that in the Kaldor-Pasinetti approach 
to the so-called Post-Keynesian or Neo-Kaldorian theory of 
functional income distribution there is a clear distinction 
between different propensities to save out of different types 
of income (contractual income vs. income from property) as 
against different propensities from different classes of in­
come receivers (workers vs. capitalists). Kaldor, in partic­
ular, has stressed the former distinction whereas Pasinetti 
worked with the latter distinction in his celebrated paper.
We take the Pasinetti approach and work with the distinction 
between different classes of income receivers— i.e., workers 
and capitalists.
Further, in these early and justly famous papers the 
savings propensities were assumed to be constant. This is 
quite obviously a very unrealistic assumption; however, the 
most damaging assumptions are related to full employment and 
the long-run equilibrium framework.
Using simple but not unrealistic assumptions about typi­




























































































the dynamical interaction between wages, profits and employ­
ment when both workers and capitalists invest— albeit for 
achieving different goals.
2. The Model
We assume a closed, essentially noncompetitive one good 
economy with no explicit role for government. These assump­
tions can be easily relaxed. We postulate behavioural equa­
tions for five crucial variables: money-wages, prices, pro­
ductivity, capacity utilization (and for labour hoarding) 
and investment, to derive from these a dynamical system of 
general non-linear differential equations in the share of 
wages and the employment ratio.
(a) Money-wage dynamics :
m
m v,
and f  > 0 w.r.t. all arguments
1 _ f e e ,  for m £ m.
where : m: money-wages
v = L/N: employment ratio
L: employed labour force




Thus, according to equation (1), the dynamics of the propor­
tional growth in money-wages are determined by workers' bar­




























































































(b) Price formation :
^ = A (log m - log p + log tt - log Y + log L)
i.e., ^ = A (log it - log u)
P
mLwhere: u = — share of wagespY
tt > 1 (mark-up factor)
A > 0 (adjustment coefficient)
(2 )
(3)
Rewriting (3) in a more general way, we have:
^ = g (u; A , ir ) (4)
where g ' > 0 and g e C u
1
The simple hypothesis underlying the above price equation is 
that actual prices adjust to equilibrium prices with a simple 
exponentially distributed log— the value of the adjustment 
coefficient and the mark-up factor are proxies for capital­
ists' power to counteract adverse money-wage dynamics. It is 
assumed, of course, that prices are set by capitalists.
(c) Productivity :
and h e .
(5)
where: K = total capacity (capital stock) in the economy.
Equation (5) encapsulates the classic Kaldorian technical 
progress function in almost its full non-linear generality.
(d) Capacity Utilization (and Labour Hoarding):
We will assume that the desired utilization level of ca­
pacity is achieved only when employment is full, i.e., when 




























































































same time enabling us to obtain long-run constancy in the 
capital-output ratio with short-run labour-hoarding) is to 
posit the following:









We now come to the crucial relationship: the investment
behaviour by capitalists and workers.
K = K + K (7)c w
where: K^: capital stock owned by capitalists
K^: capital stock owned by workers.
Taking slightly modified version(s) of the first of Kaldor's 
three investment equations which he presented in his now fa­
mous growth model of 1957 (the second and third versions were 
developed in the 'Corfu Model' and the 'Kaldor-Mirrlees' mod­
el; cf. Kaldor (1957), (1961), and Kaldor-Mirrlees (1962)), 
we get:
K = K ^ + s (v,u)u*Y w w Y w
K = K J + s (u)•(1 - u)Y C C Y C
( 8 )
(9)
The first term in either equation reflects the assumption 
that the respective classes increase the stock of capital 
owned by them in proportion to the proportional growth in 
output as a whole— i.e., to maintain 'own' capital-output ra­
tios, to be viewed as a variant of the accelerator principle. 
The second term, on the other hand, shows the ex-ante savings 




























































































if unemployment was increasing, s (v,u) would be high or ifw
the share of wages were too high, s^ (u) would be low. The 
former emphasizing the employment criterion, the latter the 
profit criterion. Unlike the restrictive Kaldor-Pasinetti 
framework, where savings propensities were constant, we are 
able not only to introduce an element of explicit conflict, 
but also, for the system as a whole, an element of comple­
mentarity. From the above, the aggregate economy-wide in­
vestment equation would be:
K  + Ìc K Y 1
---Y--- = y = Y * Y (Kw  + V + Sw (V,U) 'U + SC (U) (1 " U) (10)
Substituting (6) in (10) and rearranging we get:
K Y , , , 1- = - + s (v,u) .u K Y w q (v)
1+ s (u) • (1 - u)c q (v) (1 1 )
Now, equations (1) - (11) constitute the basic elements of 
the model. We proceed to derive the reduced-form equations 
for the employment-ratio and the share of wages as follows. 
From (6) we get
K _ Y _ q'(v) _ .
K Y q (v) (1 2 )
Using (11) and (12) we get:
- = — 77—T- • - (s (v ,u) *u + s (u) • (1 - u) } v q (v) v w c
or - = G(v,u) v




From (5) and (11) we get:
(u,v)*u* _J__q (v) + s (u) • (1 c u)
_ 1 ___




























































































Assuming separability, we have:
mu Y LThus: — - —Y L B  ̂ (h C 3 } = d { h [ J } = D(u,v) . (19)
Then, finally, from u = —  we get:
• • •u _ m £
u m p (2 0 )
Substituting (1), (4) and (19) appropriately we get:
- = H (u , v) u (2 1 )
where:
H (u, v) = f [v,g(u;X , tt ),D(u ,v )J - g(u;X , tt ) - D(u,v) (22)
It is easily seen that long-run constancy in the share of 
wages can be achieved if money-wage dynamics are such that 
wage rises are due to perfect anticipation (expectations) of 
inflation (absence of money illusion) and growth in produc­
tivity. Clearly, inflation can play a decisive role in re­
distributing shares, whereas productivity seems to be the de­
termining factor in the secular rise in real wage rates. The 
crucial reduced-form dynamical system in the employment ratio 
and the share of wages is given by (14) and (21) taken simul­
taneously. We now analyze the (dis-equilibrium) dynamical 
properties of this system under some standard assumptions 




























































































3. Dynamics of the Model
In the standard Kaldor-Pasinetti framework, two impor­
tant relations have to be satisfied. The first is the ine­
quality relation between the two savings propensities; the 
second is Pasinetti's assumption about the amount of savings 
made by workers who receive profits. More precisely:
. . . in the long run, when workers save, they receive 
an amount of profits . . . such as to make their total 
savings exactly equal to the amount that the capital­
ists would have saved out of workers' profits . . .  if 
these profits remained to them.
(Pasinetti, op. cit., p. 111)
The assumptions we shall make to generate equilibrium dynam­
ics from any disequilibrium situation (in the phase-plane of 
u and v) will be comparable to the above two relations. 
However, we shall not be able to rule out possible long-run 
underemployment equilibria— indeed, we do not wish to do so, 
since one of the main purposes of the analysis presented 
here is to try to show what workers can do to maintain full 
employment. Implicitly, we also argue for a reorientation 
of workers' strategies in wage bargaining— if full employ­
ment (and share in output) is (are) the dominant target(s).
Clearly, we have, first of all, to investigate the 
signs of the following four partials:
a) ^  and d) ^  3V gu
if we are to make any meaningful propositions about qualita­
tive dynamics. Now, direct computation gives us the follow­
ing :
3_G _ 1
3 u q' (v)
1_



































































































The influence of increasing share of wages on the unemploy­
ment ratio will be the resultant of two, partly, opposing 
forces. On the one hand capitalists' propensity to invest 
may be blunted; on the other hand, workers, to the extent 
that full employment is important, will have to compensate 
for any such negative impact on investment from the capital­
ists' side. This is precisely the assumption made by 
Pasinetti. In our case, therefore, this will be in terms of
a relationship between w and
asu For simplicity let us9u 8u
assume that changes in these two factors exactly compensate 
each other. Then, the sign of (23) depends on the relation­
ship between the absolute values of the savings propensities
9sc— since, by assumption and q'(v) are negative. Now we 
make the Kaldorian assumption explicitly, i.e., that the 
savings propensities of capitalists are greater than those 
of the workers. Then the first term inside the curly brack­
ets will be negative; the second term by assumption zero; 
the last term negative. Thus:
as >oau (24)







In this case, it is quite reasonable, economically, to as­
sume that the effects on money-wage rises of increasing em­
ployment are greater than those on productivity. (We shall 
comment on the opposite assumption at a later stage—  cf. 
below p. .) Then:
3H





























































































j p = _ ja. _ _g> (27
gu gu gu gu
The redistributive role of inflation and thus, implicitly, 
the relative strengths of capital and labour is crucial in 
determining the sign of this relation. If we assume that 
capitalists' pricing policies are more aggressive than work­
ers ' bargaining capabilities then clearly will be nega­
tive. Put another way, this means that unless workers can 
more than compensate for inflation by perfect expectations, 
capitalists can choose the mark-up factor and the adjustment 
coefficient in such a way that they will at least (in the 








3v fs (v,u) *u + s (u) - u*s (u)| * fq" (v) • v+q ' (v)/ u w____________ c__________c -1 ____________ J
[q' (v) *v̂ j 2
(29)
By assumption q'(v) and q"(v) are negative and positive re­
spectively. To be consistent with our earlier assumptions




Since we have assumed s > s and since also u < 1, it isc w
clear that (s^u) - [(s^u) - s^(v,u)) uj } will be positive. 
The relationship between the absolute values of q" and q' is 
more complicated. However, for any empirical form of q(v) 
(example: q(v) = k v , where k : desired capacity utiliza­
tion; 0 < y < 1) jq"(v)| will be greater than q'(v) . This 
means that with standard labour hoarding assumptions, most of 




























































































zation of capacity. Under these assumptions then:
(30)
Relations (23) - (30) and the underlying economic assumptions
determine the general nature of the motion of the dynamical 
system in the phase-plane of the share of wages and the unem­
ployment ratio. A typical possibility is shown in figure 1. 
We omit technical theorems about existence, uniqueness, sta­
bility (both global asymptotic and structural). By introduc­
ing, explicitly, the possibilities for workers to influence 
the rate of growth of output, productivity and capacity we 
are able to see how a point in the u-v plane such that v = 1 
can be reached. To some extent we are, in this framework,
able to vindicate Kaldor's intuition about monotone long-run
I
tendencies towards stable 'more-or-less' full employment 































































































It is clear, from inspection of figure 1, that any fea­
sible equilibrium will be at least locally asymptotically 
stable. Under some very mild additional conditions global 
asymptotic stability and strucutral stability can be proved. 
It is also clear that any equilibrium will be unique under 
the conditions specified in this section.
Economically, existence of the capitalist class presup­
poses positive share to that group. This means u is strict­
ly less than unity, say u << 1. For any u > u capitalists
could be expected to react by cutting down investment. The 
adverse effects on employment must then be counteracted by 
stimulating investment by workers. Thus, for example, from 
any disequilibrium position above u the economic dynamics 
towards an equilibrium would be as indicated by the arrows 
in point I. The increased investment by the workers, to 
preserve or stimulate the level of employment, by increasing 
productivity via the technical progress function restores 
that balance in the share of output consistent with capital­
ists' desires. This latter is brought about by the interac­
tion between money-wage rates rising more due to productivi­
ty effects (either by deliberate policy restraint by workers 
or by some other means) than inflationary or bargaining ef­
fects— and the possible flexibility in manipulating the ad­
justment coefficient and the mark-up factor in the dynamics 
of the price equation.
It must, therefore, be possible to imagine that most of 
the functional forms change as a function of the level and 
rate of economic activity. This, as we point out below in 
section 4, means that somewhat more sophisticated analysis 
is required for complete description.




























































































tion for the existence of the capitalist class, there will be 
a lower bound on v that will be acceptable to the workers. 
This, in addition to a lower bound on money-wage rates and 
constraints on the mark-up factor (political, institutional 
or otherwise) and the adjustment coefficient will effectively 
set limits in the positive orthant circumscribed by the ori­
gin and u = 1 and v = 1 .
Whether there exist feasible equilibrium or not, and in 
the latter case how the functional forms change as the vari­
ous limits (upper bound on u = u, or natural limits u = 1 , 
v = 1 , etc.) are approached requires detailed empirical in­
vestigation which is beyond the scope of the limited aims of 
this paper.
|
4. Notes and Conclusions
So far, we have tried to remain within a Kaldorian 
framework (in terms of the technical progress function, in­
vestment function, inequalities w.r.t. the savings propensi­
ties, wage bargaining and mark-up pricing with an implicit 
assumption about labour hoarding). If we analyze the 'dual 
Pasinetti' case, inequalities w.r.t. savings propensities re­
versed, with more or less all other assumptions intact, the 
resulting dynamics in the u-v plane may generate limit cycles 
and, in the limit, a structurally unstable centre.
We have all along retained the two parameters related to 
the mark-up factor (it) and the adjustment coefficient (\) .
The reason for this is that the most immediate generalization 
should be bifurcation analysis of the u-v system w.r.t. these 
two parameters. Obviously these two parameters are 'endoge­




























































































in bifurcation analysis. However, if either of these param­
eters depends exclusively on time explicitly then (in par­
ticular, if the dual-Pasinetti case becomes important) the 
analysis should be in terms of that which is analogous to 
bifurcation analysis for non-autonomous systems (this is 
called 'branching of periodic solutions') (cf. Cronin (1980) 
Ch. 7, § A) .
Three important directions in which the model should be 
generalized to take account of more realistic factors would 
be:
a) Open economy
b) Explicit introduction of the State
and c) Introduction of Money in an essential way. 
Qualitatively, (a) and (b) in simple dynamic models are not 
difficult to analyze within the framework of what has been 
presented above. However, the problem of introducing money 
or monetary factors in an essential way is more complicated. 
For example, an immediate generalization should be to incor­
porate a distinction between the (real) rate of profit and 
the money rate of interest in the investment equations and 
then expected inflation in a non-trivial way in the wage 
bargaining equation. This will require the phase-plane to 
be enlarged at least to a state-space of 3 dimensions. The 
problem, though not unmanageable, will involve, in analysis, 
loss of the two-dimensional elegance of geometry (and indeed 
the possibilities of invoking the powerful Poincare-Bendixson 
theorem).
An even more important, and perhaps more interesting, 
direction in which to proceed would be to make more explicit 
the nature of the conflicting and complementary nature of 



























































































gant way, within the framework of dynamical systems, would 
be to use differential games. This means that the employ­
ment and shares criteria would be explicitly introduced in 
a criterion function for the workers and, say, profits cri­
terion in that which represents capitalists' desires. Typ­
ically, this would be a non-zero sum game with possibili­
ties for cooperative solutions. In particular, the intro­
duction of the state (a third player in the game) and an 
open economy (rest of the world as a fourth player) fits 
naturally in a differential game framework.
In summary, then, we have been able to show, contrary 
to many popular interpretations of Kaldor (e.g. Brems 
(1979)) that within the framework of Kaldorian assumptions, 
when workers not only save, but also invest, full employ­
ment as a result, when it is a target, is not impossible—  
with long-run constancy in distributive shares. However sw
is no longer insignificant for the determination of the 
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